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Chapter 2
Pension Economics
Formal economic analysis of the incentives that are embedded in pension
plans began around 1970. Since that time, labor economists have increas-
ingly turned their attention to explaining the human resource policies of
Wrms and how those policies affect the behavior of workers. Over the past
three decades, theoretical and empirical studies have shown that pension
plans are an important part of compensation, and employers use pensions
to attract, retain, motivate, and retire workers. The history of public sector
pensions in the United States shows that government ofWcials and public
administrators have understood these aspects of pensions for over two
hundred years. This chapter provides a brief, nontechnical review of the
modern theory of pension economics. The theory is then used to examine
the development of public pensions in the nineteenth century. The paral-
lels between contemporary economic theory and the nineteenth-century
application of pensions as a human resource tool are striking, and they
provide numerous lessons for today’s policy analysts.
There are two basic types of pension plans: deWned beneWt plans and
deWned contribution plans. DeWned beneWt plans promise workers a speci-
Wed beneWt at retirement based on years of service, annual earnings,
and/or position in the organization. In deWned contribution plans, the
employer and/or the worker make periodic contributions to a pension
account. BeneWts are based on these contributions and the investment
returns accrued during the work life.1 Historically, most public and private
pension plans have been deWned beneWt plans; however, in the last quarter
of the twentieth century, there was a pronounced shift away from deWned
beneWt plans and toward increasing utilization of deWned contribution
plans (Clark and McDermed 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier 1992; EBRI
1997). During the past decade, a number of large companies have con-
verted traditional deWned beneWt plans into so-called “cash balance” or
pension equity plans. [These hybrid plans have some of the characteristics
of both deWned beneWt and deWned contribution plans (Clark and Schieber
2002a, b), and they bear some resemblance to the early public sector plans,
such as the Massachusetts state plan of 1911 (see above and Chapter 10).]
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The U.S. military pension plans examined in this volume were all deWned
beneWt plans, as were most of the early state and local plans. The initial
reliance on deWned beneWt plans reXects the work and retirement incen-
tives associated with these plans and the limited Wnancial markets that
existed during much of the nineteenth century.
Defined Benefit Plans
Today, most deWned beneWt plans specify a retirement beneWt based on
years of service with the organization and the worker’s Wnal average annual
earnings during the last three or Wve years on the job. Some collectively
bargained plans base beneWts solely on years of service. Workers must
remain with the organization for a sufWcient period of time, typically Wve
years, to become vested in the pension plan. Once vested, the worker has a
legal claim on future retirement beneWts and is entitled to a beneWt at the
retirement age speciWed in the plan.2 This means that the worker can leave
the Wrm prior to the speciWed retirement age and still receive a beneWt in
the future. 
Most of the early public plans speciWed a retirement beneWt based on the
position or rank of the individual. BeneWts were usually speciWed in terms
of percentage of monthly pay. In order to receive a retirement beneWt, the
individual had to remain with the organization for many years, typically
20 to 25 years but often longer. Leaving prior to that time meant that the
employee would not receive any beneWts. The lack of vesting in these early
plans provided a strong incentive for workers to remain on the job until
they reached the age of retirement. Since discharged workers could not
expect to receive any pension beneWts, these plans also provided additional
motivation for workers to perform at a high level so they would not be Wred.
Of course, there were some moral hazards built into the employer’s side of
these contracts, since employers had an incentive to dismiss workers as they
approached retirement age and thus became eligible for pension beneWts.
Employer-provided pension plans are a signiWcant component of total
employee compensation for covered workers. As such, the value of these
plans helps employers to attract high-quality new workers. In addition,
workers who have low discount rates will place a higher value on the
promise of retirement beneWts, and employees who are otherwise more
likely to remain with the Wrm for longer periods of time will place a higher
value on the pension plan (Ippolito 1997). Thus, employers can use pen-
sion plans to help sort workers based on their propensity to remain on the
job. Companies that have relatively high costs of hiring and training work-
ers will want to minimize turnover. These companies are more likely to
establish retirement plans that provide incentives for workers to remain
with their employer. Thus, pension plans can help Wrms attract the type of
employees they prefer (Salop and Salop 1976). 
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A simple numerical example can illustrate this point. Suppose a worker
is considering two job offers. The Wrst pays only a monthly salary of $1,000
while the second offers a salary of $950 per month plus a pension plan
of $250 per month conditional on the worker remaining with the Wrm for
20 years. These two compensation policies are depicted in Figure 2.1. The
present value of this future beneWt depends on the interest and discount
rates and the probability that the individual remains with the Wrm until
retirement. Workers expecting to leave the Wrm after only a few years will
prefer the Wrst job while workers who expect to remain with the Wrm for at
least 20 years will be more likely to consider accepting the second job offer.
By deferring a part of labor compensation, the Wrm is less likely to attract
workers with high probabilities of turnover and more likely to hire individ-
uals who are willing to remain with the Wrm for a long period of time. 
Once employed, workers evaluate the gain from remaining on the job
versus moving to another employer or retiring. A key aspect of total com-
pensation is the change in the present value of expected retirement beneWts
from working an additional year. This is called the beneWt accrual. In a
legal sense, accruals are zero until the individual becomes vested in the
pension; that is, a worker who quits or is Wred for nonperformance will not
receive any beneWt unless he has worked the minimum amount of time
required for vesting. Once having been employed for the minimum num-
ber of years required to be eligible for a beneWt, the worker can leave the
Wrm and ultimately receive a pension. This pension will typically become
larger the longer the person stays with the company. These beneWt accruals
represent a component of annual compensation and are an incentive for the
worker to remain with the Wrm (Ippolito 1985; Kotlikoff and Wise 1989).
Workers may look ahead to the promise of future beneWts and calculate
the gain in those beneWts conditional on remaining with the organization.
One of the innovations of modern pension economics was to place these
pension expectations within the context of implicit long-term employment
contracts (Lazear 1979; Ippolito 1985). These models assume workers can
calculate the value of future retirement beneWts if they remain with the Wrm
and the value if they quit. Again, this “quit” pension is zero if the worker is
not vested. The difference between the pension conditional on remaining
with the organization and the pension if the worker quits is the loss in pen-
sion wealth associated with changing jobs. The bigger this difference, the
less likely workers are to quit (Allen, Clark, and McDermed 1993; Ippolito
1987; Mitchell 1982). For example, a study of federal workers in the last
quarter of the twentieth century concludes that the very low turnover rate
among federal employees is, at least partly, due to the unusually large pen-
sion penalties for leaving the civil service before the age of early retirement
(Ippolito 1987).
Once again, a simple example can illustrate the importance of the pen-
sion incentive. Assume that a worker earns $20,000 during the Wrst 20 years
Pension Economics 13
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Years
Figure 2.1. Compensation proWles with and without a pension. Two potential earn-
ings proWles illustrate how a Wrm can use the promise of a pension to reduce
turnover. The analysis is based on a 20-year worklife followed by 10 years in retire-
ment, with an interest rate of 3 percent. Compensation option 1 provides a wage of
$1000 per month; the present value of working for 20 years is $178,800. Obviously,
any worker expecting to leave the Wrm with less than 20 years of service would pre-
fer option 1. 
Option 2 provides $950 per month plus a pension of $250 per month conditional
on the worker remaining with the Wrm for 20 years. The worker gives up $50 per
month in exchange for a retirement annuity of $250. The present value of $50 per
month for 20 years is $8,940; the present value (at the hire date) of $250 per month
commencing after 20 years and lasting for 10 years is $14,177. Thus under option 2
the present value of total compensation is $184,037.
14 Chapter 2
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of her working career and $40,000 over the last 20 years of work. Further
assume that her annual earnings will not be affected by changing jobs and
all employers offer a deWned beneWt plan that provides a beneWt that is
equal to one percent of average earnings over the last Wve years of employ-
ment. A worker who spends all 40 years working for a single Wrm will have
a retirement beneWt of $16,000 per year—that is, 40 years of service times
$40,000 per year in average earnings times 0.01. This last Wgure, 0.01, is
sometimes referred to as the “generosity factor.”
If she changes jobs after 20 years of employment, she will receive two pen-
sions, one from each Wrm that employed her for 20 years. The pension
from the Wrst job would be $4,000 (20 years of service times $20,000 times
0.01) and the pension from the second job would be $8,000 (20 years of ser-
vice times $40,000 times 0.01). Thus, her total pension would be $12,000.
This example, which is depicted in Figure 2.2, shows that when earnings are
unaffected by a job change and all companies have identical pension plans,
a job change can have a signiWcant impact on retirement beneWts. It is this
potential for loss in the lifetime values of pensions that reduces turnover
among pension participants, holding other things constant, of course.
Both the gain in future beneWts from continued employment and the loss
in pension beneWts associated with leaving inXuence worker behavior.
These pension characteristics affect individual decisions concerning which
job to accept and, once employed, whether to remain with the organization
or seek new employment. Employers can alter the magnitude of these in-
centives by adopting certain pension provisions. In jobs with high train-
ing costs and other turnover costs, employers will want to have lower quit
rates. Instituting a pension plan and selecting pension provisions that pro-
vide for higher beneWt accruals and large losses in beneWts if the worker
leaves should result in a lower quit rate.
Pensions can also be used to motivate workers to perform at a higher
level and to prevent shirking on the job (Becker and Stigler 1974; Lazear
1979). If, for example, a worker is caught shirking, is found to have stolen
from the employer, or has a high absence rate, he could be discharged and
thus lose retirement beneWts. Thus, the same incentives that encourage
workers not to quit will provide an incentive to perform at a high level to
avoid discharge (Dorsey 1995). Therefore, we would expect lower quit
and layoff (discharge) rates in organizations that have adopted deWned
beneWt pension plans, a Wnding conWrmed by much research (Allen, Clark,
and McDermed 1993; Cornwell, Dorsey, and Mehrzad 1991; Lazear and
Moore 1988). Since Wrms with lower turnover rates can afford to invest
more heavily in the human capital of their employees, ceteris paribus, we
would expect to see these Wrms pay higher wages, which is what one Wnds
in practice (Becker 1964; Dorsey and Macpherson 1997; Dorsey, Cornwell,
and Macpherson 1998).
Pension Economics 15
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Figure 2.2. Impact of changing jobs on pension beneWts. The Wgure shows annual
earnings for a worker who earns $20,000 per year for the Wrst twenty years of
employment and $40,000 per year for the next 20 years. All employers have a
deWned beneWt pension plan with a beneWt formula of 1.0 percent per year of ser-
vice × salary average over the past 5 years. 
Total earnings are the same whether the worker remains with the same employer
for the full period or changes jobs. The worker who stays with the same employer
will have an annual pension beneWt of $16,000 (0.01 × 40 years × $40,000). The
worker who changes jobs after 20 years will receive two pensions totaling $12,000
annually—$4,000 from job 1 (0.01 × 20 years × $20,000) plus $8,000 from job 2
(0.01 × 20 years × $40,000). Thus changing jobs once lowers the annual retirement
beneWt by $4,000.
DeWned beneWt pensions can also alter the incentive to retire at particu-
lar ages by providing income to those who have retired and by altering
the annual beneWt accrual. Today’s pensions, as well as many of those in the
past, sharply reduce the beneWt accrual once the individual has reached the
age of eligibility to begin receiving a beneWt. Virtually all modern pensions
specify both an early and a normal retirement age. The normal retirement
age is the age at which workers can retire and receive a beneWt based on the
regular beneWt formula; this is called an “unreduced” beneWt. The early
retirement age is the earliest age at which a person can receive a beneWt.
16 Chapter 2
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Workers retiring at or after the early retirement age but before the normal
retirement age receive a reduced beneWt. The reduction in the annual
beneWt is applied because an individual who starts receiving beneWts at an
earlier age can be expected to receive beneWts for a longer period of time
than one who retires later. If beneWts were actuarially reduced, the present
value of the lifetime pension beneWts would be the same regardless of the
age at which the person retired. 
Most pensions in the twenty-Wrst century provide early retirement beneWts
that are reduced by a factor less than the “actuarial rate.” This means that
early retirement is subsidized relative to retirement at the normal retire-
ment age. In other words, the beneWt is reduced by less than the amount
that is consistent with life expectancy. As a result, these plans provide a
strong incentive for workers to retire prior to the normal retirement age.
Recent studies examined individual plans with characteristics that resulted
in a substantial loss of pension wealth for those who continued to work after
the age of early retirement. In some plans, employees lost up to half of the
present value of their lifetime pension wealth by working past early retire-
ment up to age 65 (Burkhauser 1979; Fields and Mitchell 1984). 
The impact of continued employment on the present value of pension
beneWts could also be illustrated with a simple numerical example. Consi-
der a pension plan with a normal retirement age of 65 and a beneWt formula
that speciWes that a maximum of 30 years of service can be used to calculate
beneWts. BeneWts are determined as one percent per year of service times
the average of the last three years of earnings. A worker reaches age 65 hav-
ing worked for the company for 30 years. She has been earning $25,000 per
year for the past Wve years and expects to continue to earn $25,000 per year
if she remains with the Wrm. This worker expects to die at age 80. 
If she retires at age 65, the worker would receive $7,500 per year for each
of the next 15 years before she dies at age 80; however, if she works one
more year and then retires at age 66, she would receive the same $7,500 per
year for the next 14 years. Thus, by continuing to work, the employee gives
up $7,500 per year. In a real sense, her total compensation for working
at age 65 is not $25,000 but $17,500 (i.e., $25,000 in earnings minus the
$7,500 in pension income forgone). While this example (depicted in Figure
2.3) ignores the potential for future beneWts to rise with additional years of
service and higher average earnings, it does illustrate the potential for a
substantial loss in pension wealth with continued employment. The magni-
tude of this pension loss depends on various pension characteristics. Firms
seeking to provide retirement incentives can adopt plan characteristics that
increase the size of the loss in pension wealth with continued employment
and can determine the age at which the loss begins.
The decline in pension wealth follows from a dramatic decline in the
annual beneWt accrual. BeneWt accruals prior to reaching the age of early
retirement can represent a large component of total compensation. After
Pension Economics 17
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Figure 2.3. Impact of continued employment on pension wealth. A worker is em-
ployed at a company with a deWned beneWt pension plan using a beneWt formula of
1.0 percent per year of service × salary average over the past 3 years. The plan
speciWes that a maximum of 30 years can be used in determining retirement
beneWts, the normal retirement age is 65, and the pension doesn’t have an early
retirement age. Assume that the worker at age 65 has 30 years of service, has been
earning $25,000 per year for the past 5 years, and expects to earn $25,000 per year
until retirement. The worker expects to die at age 80 regardless of the age of retire-
ment. If retirement occurs at age 65, the worker will receive a pension of $7,500 per
year for 15 years (0.01 × 30 years × $25,000). If retirement  is delayed for 1 year, the
worker will receive the same $7,500, but only for the 14 years of remaining life. 
Prior to reaching the normal retirement age, the worker receives $25,000 in case;
moreover, future pension beneWts are increasing because of the additional years of
service. After the worker passes the normal retirement age, total compensation is
now $25,000 in case minus the $7,500 in pension beneWts forgone. Thus passing the
normal retirement age results in a substantial decline in total compensation and pre-
sents a strong economic incentive for the worker to retire.
qualifying for early retirement beneWts, beneWt accruals drop sharply
and can become negative (Kotlikoff and Wise 1987, 1989). This drop in
total compensation and immediate access to retirement beneWts provide
strong incentives for employees to retire. Numerous empirical studies
have shown that age-speciWc retirement rates are much higher at these
18 Chapter 2
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times (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994; Kotlikoff and Wise 1989; Quinn,
Burkhauser, and Myers 1990). Firms can determine the age at which these
incentives become effective, and the size of the incentive, by setting the age
of early and normal retirement, the magnitude of the reduction factor, and
other pension characteristics. Thus, pensions can be an important human
resource management tool for employers seeking to inXuence the age of
retirement of their workforce.
Prior to the middle of the twentieth century, relatively few Wrms included
early retirement provisions in their pension plans (Schieber 2002). Instead,
these plans merely speciWed a normal retirement age and required workers
to meet certain age and service qualiWcations. In these early deWned beneWt
plans, the retirement incentives described above would occur, or “kick in,”
at the normal retirement age. In addition, many public employers adopted
mandatory retirement policies as part of their early pension plans. The
mandatory retirement age was typically age 65, the same age as the normal
retirement in their pension plan. Both the army and navy of the United
States adopted mandatory retirement during the Civil War period in an
effort to purge the ofWcer corps of elderly, senior ofWcers.3 Of course, these
veterans with many years of military service were provided a pension. Thus,
the federal government achieved the desired retirement patterns while pro-
viding a continuing source of income for its retirees. 
Taken together, the development of modern pension economics has
demonstrated the Wnancial incentives associated with deWned beneWt pen-
sion plans. Economic theory has been used to indicate the value of future
pension beneWts and to show how these beneWts change with continued
employment. Empirical studies indicate that pension-covered workers have
lower quit and layoff rates compared to similar workers whose employers do
not provide a pension plan. Furthermore, this review of the contemporary
literature on pensions suggests that they are optimal or efWcient contracts
between employers and workers. An optimal or efWcient contract is one in
which both parties are made better off from the adoption of a pension con-
tract (Craig 1995). Obviously, government policymakers in the nineteenth
century were not aware of these economic studies; however, their actions
indicate that they understood many of these incentives. The early use of
pensions in military organizations is consistent with modern theories of pen-
sion economics. Consider, for example that the military is particularly sus-
ceptible to the costs of turnover. The jobs are often highly specialized with
few private-sector parallels, and a regiment in the Weld or ship at sea can-
not easily replace many of its key personnel. The need to retain these indi-
viduals during times of conXict was extremely important to the nation.
In addition, it was often necessary to recall discharged veterans to active duty
when war broke out. Retirement pensions provided a form of compensation
that men simply could not Wnd in civilian employment in the nineteenth
century. In addition, the U.S. military was a leader in providing disability
Pension Economics 19
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beneWts to its personnel. A man who was about to storm an enemy trench
or board an enemy man-of-war could take some comfort in knowing he or
his widow would be taken care of should he be wounded or killed in action.
Defined Contribution Plans
DeWned contribution plans do not specify an annual beneWt at the normal
retirement age. Instead, these plans are based on annual contributions to
pension accounts, and retirement beneWts are determined by the size of the
account when the individual converts the account balance into an annuity.
Contribution rates tend to be the same percentage of earnings throughout
one’s career. In general, these plans are more “age neutral” in their effect
on worker behavior. 
Coverage by a deWned contribution plan clearly is an employee beneWt
with value for workers. These plans can help organizations attract and
retain workers. However, deWned contribution plans typically do not im-
pose a loss in pension beneWts on vested workers who leave the Wrm prior
to early or normal retirement. As a result, organizations with this type of
plan will have higher turnover rates compared to those with deWned beneWt
plans. In addition, there are no magic retirement dates in deWned contri-
bution plans; so age-speciWc retirement rates are likely to increase more
smoothly in Wrms with these types of plans.
Until the last quarter of the twentieth century, employers primarily relied
on deWned beneWt pension plans; this is true of almost all the public plans
examined in this volume. Over the last three decades, employers, both pub-
lic and private, have increasingly turned to deWned contribution plans.
Reasons for this change include new government regulations that have
increased the administrative cost of deWned beneWt plans relative to deWned
contribution plans (Clark and McDermed 1990), the introduction of new
types of deWned contribution plans such as 401(k) plans (Papke 1999), and
changes in the structure of the U.S. economy. Workers, and perhaps em-
ployers too, in the twenty-Wrst century seem to prefer pension plans with
individual accounts that are more portable than the beneWts in deWned
beneWt plans.4
Because deWned contribution plans create a fund into which the contri-
butions are placed, they also require assets that can be purchased and
placed in the fund. Limited access to immature Wnancial markets is another
reason that most nineteenth-century pension plans were deWned beneWt
plans. It would not have been easy for the typical American in the 1800s to
invest retirement funds in a timely manner in relatively secure accounts.
Mutual funds did not exist, and the occupation of Wnancial planner was
unknown. There were Xedgling securities markets in major port cities, but
for an individual living inland from the East Coast or in rural areas, buying
and selling securities would have been very difWcult. Although Wnancial
20 Chapter 2
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markets developed quickly in the post-revolutionary period, access to these
markets remained quite limited for most of the population. 
At the time of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, which ended the Revolutionary
War, there were essentially no organized stock or bond markets in America.
Shortly thereafter, organized Wnancial markets did begin to develop in
Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Baltimore, and Charleston. At the end of
the war, there were various colonial debt instruments outstanding, such
as Loan OfWce CertiWcates and Indents. The buying and selling of these
instruments was ubiquitous. Alexander Hamilton consolidated the war debt
during his term as the Wrst secretary of treasury. This action created about
$60 million of marketable long-term bonds, which were held by the newly
created state governments as well as approximately 14,000 individual in-
vestors. In other words, only about 0.25 percent of the population owned
U.S. government securities. In 1791, the First Bank of the United States was
chartered and its stock became actively traded, at least in the major cities.
The U.S. bonds and stock of the First Bank were quite actively traded in all
of the major markets as well as between markets. In addition, a large por-
tion of U.S. assets was held in London and Amsterdam.
In addition to U.S. bonds and stocks, states eventually began to charter
banks, and these new Wnancial institutions sold stock to the public. There
were also various canal, toll-bridge, and turnpike companies with outstand-
ing shares of stock that could be purchased by interested investors. The
New York Stock & Exchange was formed in 1817 to facilitate the trading
of shares of stock. During this period, Wnancial markets were typically lim-
ited to the shares of Wrms in the local area. Integration of these emerging
markets took several decades accompanied by improvements in the trans-
portation network and communication, thus reducing the time required
for news to move from one market to another. 
In 1790, the travel time between New York and Boston was about four
days; it required one day to get from Philadelphia to New York and three
days from Philadelphia to Baltimore. By 1810, travel time from New York
to Boston had been reduced to three days and from New York to Phila-
delphia to less than 24 hours. Similarly, the time required for informa-
tion to pass between the major cities continued to decline throughout the
nineteenth century. By 1830, a traveler could go between New York and
Boston in less than a day and travel time between Philadelphia and New
York or Baltimore was less than twelve hours (Pred 1973). Of course, com-
munication with European Wnancial centers still required many days.
Travel between Philadelphia and Europe in 1800 took just over two months.
Between 1818 and 1832, required travel time fell to about 38 days. The
advent of steamships in the middle of the century reduced sailing time to
13 to 22 days (Pred 1973; OfWcer 1996). Thus the primitive nature of
Wnancial markets and Wnancial market information tended to work against
the use of deWned contribution pension plans. 
Pension Economics 21
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The primary or benchmark security in the early republic was federal
debt; however, throughout much of this period, the federal government
was redeeming its debt, thus further limiting investment options in this
already thin Wnancial market. Gradually over the nineteenth century,
Wnancial markets expanded with the growth of the American economy
while communications and transportation improvements made it possible
for economic news to spread more quickly from one market to the other.
Financial markets at the end of the century were certainly more mature,
integrated, and broader based than those in 1800. Financial innovations
continued into the twentieth century, making it easier for workers and Wrms
to adopt and manage deWned contribution plans.
Early Public Sector Pension Plans 
Pension economics and the use of economic theory to explain the human
resource policies of Wrms are relatively recent innovations. The ensuing
chapters illustrate that nineteenth-century policy–makers understood many
of the incentives associated with pension plans. Federal government ofW-
cials developed plans and adopted speciWc characteristics that helped the
military attract, retain, and motivate army and navy personnel and then
to retire them in an orderly manner at desired ages. Similarly, leaders of
large cities and then state governments began to offer retirement plans to
important government workers such as personnel in Wre and police depart-
ments and school teachers. Pension plans became important components
of labor compensation in the public sector and the development of these
plans illustrates that employers were aware of the economic incentives asso-
ciated with pension plans.
As noted above, historically, public employers primarily selected deWned
beneWt plans for their workers. Among these early deWned beneWt plans
were the federal military plans and most of the early state and local pen-
sions. This choice of deWned beneWt plans may have occurred because the
early plan creators and managers recognized the greater quit, perfor-
mance, and retirement incentives in deWned beneWt plans compared to
deWned contribution plans. Another possible explanation for the early use
of deWned beneWt plans is that the typical worker had few if any Wnancial
assets and did not want to bear the investment risk associated with deWned
contribution plans. Furthermore, as noted, the Wnancial markets of the
United States in the nineteenth century were rather thin, were concen-
trated in the larger cities, and were notorious for their maltreatment of
small investors. Thus, workers would have had relatively few investment
options for their funds in their individual deWned contribution accounts. As
a result, deWned beneWt plans would seem to have been the optimal pension
plan for nineteenth-century American workers. The review now turns to the
history of these plans.
22 Chapter 2
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Notes
1. McGill et al. (1996) provide a detailed description of these two different types
of plans, how they are funded, the rate of beneWt accruals, and so forth.
2. Since 1974, the federal government has required minimum vesting standards
for tax-qualiWed pension plans—that is, plans that qualify for the tax exemptions
conveyed by federal tax law. Currently, qualiWed plans must provide for 100 percent
vesting after Wve years of service or use a graded vesting formula that results in full
vesting after seven years.
3. Mandatory retirement policies were widely used by large private Wrms until the
last decade of the twentieth century. Mandatory retirement provisions also generally
covered public sector jobs. Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act in 1986 effectively ended the use of mandatory retirement in most jobs.
4. Recently, many large employers have amended their deWned beneWt plans to
include individual accounts and the potential for lump sum distributions (Clark and
Schieber 2002 a, b). These hybrid plans have many of the characteristics of deWned
contribution plans; however, for administrative and funding purposes they are
deWned beneWt plans.
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